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A book would be required to report how “the banality of evil” has become banal over the 
decades since Hannah Arendt published her controversial ”Eichmann in Jerusalem: A  
Report on the Banality of Evil” (1963). Her enemies thought she had absolved Eichmann 
of responsibility either by describing him as a “cog in the machine” or (worse) by saying  
that his deeds were banal; her supporters thought she had said there is an Eichmann in all  
of us, ready to do evil. Worn away by these kinds of misinterpretations, the phrase 
became like an ancient hieroglyph, portentous but illegible. 
So, what was she trying to convey? First, and most immediately, that the man she saw 
and heard in the Jerusalem court room in 1961 was not a Richard III sort, not a man who 
had set out to “prove a villain.” His testimony revealed no deep motivation like revenge or 
lust for power—two words, perhaps, for the same thing. In the bureaucratic German he 
spoke there was no trace of psychopathy, no sadistic pleasure from inflicting pain. Some 
Nazis undoubtedly were “radically” evil in the sense that their deeds grew from a deep or  
twisted root, but Eichmann’s motives seemed to Arendt banal – superficial. He talked in 
court about his desire to move up in the Nazi bureaucracy, for example. His ideal was to 
be a good servant to his Fuhrer’s ideas and programs.
Arendt consistently used the word “thoughtless” to explicate Eichmann’s banality. He 
could recite moral rules; he could even, when asked to do so in court, recite Kant’s famous 
categorical imperative. But for him all rules referenced “the Fuhrer’s will,” they were all 
the Fuhrer’s commandments. Eichmann could neither ask himself nor think through the 
question that Arendt considered essential to moral experience, one that she (very 
challengingly) held was not at all a matter of following rules or serving any leader’s will: 
“Could I live with myself if I did this deed?”
She was prompted to a question by Eichmann’s careerism and his thoughtless 
conformity: Can banal motives block or stifle human fellow feeling and make a person 
inhumanly thoughtless, that is, unable to think? In her trial report, Arendt was laying the 
factual foundation for a psychological exploration of this question. For example, she 
described the moment when Eichmann dedicated himself without hesitation to obeying 
the Fuhrer’s will: it was four weeks after the head of the S.S. intelligence service, 
Reinhardt Heydrich, informed him, on July 31, 1941, that a Final Solution of the Jewish 
question – that is, extermination of the Jews – had become official policy. For a month, 
Eichmann was “on the ground” (as we now say) observing firsthand the grisly preliminary 
killing operations in Poland, and feeling repelled by them. But after that period, his 
feelings of repulsion disappeared and he was, simply, the transport officer, 
conscientiously carrying out the policy. Arendt remarked: It is of great political interest to 
know how long it takes an average person to overcome his innate repugnance toward 
crime, and what exactly happens to him once he has reached that point … Yes, he had a  
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conscience, and his conscience functioned in the expected way for about four weeks,  
whereupon it began to function the other way around.”
In Arendt’s reconstruction of “what exactly happened to him,” there were three key 
ingredients. First, he never heard a word of questioning much less political debate among 
his peers or superiors. Second, he received a clarifying idea, a ‘truth,’‘ from the S.S. head  
Heinrich Himmler. Mass killings, Himmler said, were a heroic task requiring great 
courage, loyalty to the Führer, and ability to bear the suffering involved in being an 
executioner. A state executioner is a hero, tough, loyal and brave. Third, Eichmann 
adopted a “different personal attitude” (in his own words). He became nured to seeing 
dead people all around him: “We did not care if we died today or only tomorrow.” Having 
redefined executioners as heroic sufferers and having stifled his empathy for human 
suffering, including his own, Eichmann was numb enough to follow his new conscience. 
True villains and true psychopaths are, fortunately, rather rare; but, in the right 
circumstances, becoming unfeelingly obedient and inhuman in this way can become a 
common condition. When political life atrophies and debate and questioning cease, while  
thoughtful moral experience is blocked internally, the resulting capacity for evil can 
spread like an epidemic. Before she went to Jerusalem, Arendt had feared that 
thoughtlessness –“the headless recklessness or hopeless confusion or complacent 
repetition of ‘truths’ which have become trivial and empty,” as she described it in The 
Human Condition (1958)– had become “among the outstanding characteristics of our 
time.” Eichmann convinced her of the rightness of this judgment. And the 
thoughtlessness of the controversy over her book seems to me further evidence.
Listen also to the Guardian podcast ”The Big Ideas podcast: the banality of evil“, 16 Aug 
2011
Who's Afraid of Social Democracy? A blog by Elisabeth Young-Bruehl
http://elisabethyoung-bruehl.com/2011/08/22/61-personal-responsibility-under-
dictatorship/
 2 
